The Ozempic Lawsuit Master Complaint (MDL 3094): Read the Actual Document

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No Ozempic or other GLP-1 lawsuit has been settled, and no court or jury has found that these medications caused anyone's injury — the litigation is ongoing, with major expert-evidence rulings still ahead. Whether any individual has a claim depends on their own medical records and the law of their state. Do not stop, start, or change any prescribed medication because of anything on this page. Those decisions belong with your prescriber. Attorney Advertising.

The Amended Master Long Form Complaint is the central pleading of MDL 3094 — a 264-page document, filed August 29, 2025 and unsealed by the Court in October 2025, that sets out every factual allegation and all sixteen legal claims against Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly. This page is a count-by-count dissection of that document: what each of the sixteen counts actually pleads (with paragraph citations), what the defendants argued against each one in their motion-to-dismiss briefing, what Judge Marston’s August 2025 ruling kept, trimmed, or reshaped, and what none of it establishes. The full document is hosted below, along with the short form complaint each individual claimant actually files — which has its own walkthrough page.

What a master complaint is — and how it works in MDL 3094

In a large MDL, individual plaintiffs don’t each write a full complaint from scratch. Plaintiffs’ leadership files one master complaint containing the complete factual record and every legal theory; each individual case then adopts it through a much shorter filing. Case Management Order No. 27 (October 3, 2025) makes the mechanics explicit: for every case in MDL 3094, “the Master Complaint together with the Short Form Complaint shall be deemed the Plaintiff’s operative Complaint” (CMO 27 ¶ 2). The master complaint is expressly “not intended to exhaustively include all claims” — case-specific facts and any additional claims go in the individual’s short form (¶ 4) — and it neither consolidates plaintiffs’ claims nor waives any of them (¶¶ 5–6).

Three CMO 27 provisions matter more than most readers expect. First, short form complaints are filed on each individual member case’s docket, never on the master docket (¶ 12). Second, for statute-of-limitations purposes a plaintiff’s case is deemed initiated on the date of their original complaint or their short form complaint, whichever came first (¶ 11) — which is why the filing date, not the paperwork format, is what a deadline analysis turns on. Third, every short form complaint filed in the MDL is automatically “deemed answered and denied,” with the defendants’ defenses fully preserved (¶ 13) — the defendants do not answer each case one by one, and motions against individual member cases require a further court order (¶ 14).

How the complaint got its shape: the motion-to-dismiss fight

The document hosted on this page is the amended master complaint, and its structure is a direct product of a year of motion practice. The original master complaint (Doc. 294, filed November 13, 2024) pleaded seventeen counts. Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly moved to dismiss twelve of them — Counts III through XIV — plus the request for medical monitoring, in a 51-page brief filed January 24, 2025 (Doc. 329). Plaintiffs opposed in 64 pages (Doc. 364, March 18, 2025), the defendants replied (Doc. 392, April 14, 2025), and the Court heard argument on April 21, 2025. Judge Marston ruled on August 15, 2025 in a 79-page memorandum (Doc. 465) and order (Doc. 466): denied in part, granted in part — nearly all dismissals with leave to amend. The same order disposed of a request that had run alongside the motion: the defendants had asked the Court to take judicial notice of the FDA-approved labels their briefing argued from — the exhibits cited throughout their reply — and the Court denied it (Doc. 328; Doc. 466 ¶ 1). That is a ruling about what a court will treat as established at the pleading stage, not a finding that the labels do not matter; they remain central to the case.

Fourteen days later, plaintiffs filed the amended master complaint you can read here. It drops the two design-defect counts the Court found preempted, repleads the fraud counts the Court trimmed, breaks the consumer-protection and state product-liability-act claims into the count-and-checkbox structure the Court required, and renumbers everything into sixteen counts. The defendants did not file a renewed motion to dismiss the amended master complaint — no such motion appears on the master docket as of September 2026 — and under CMO 27 the pleadings-stage fight is effectively closed, with the litigation’s center of gravity now on expert evidence and summary judgment. The mapping from old to new:

One consequence of that history is easy to miss: because the count numbers changed, commentary written about “Count VII” or “Count XIII” before August 2025 refers to different claims than the same numbers refer to today. The dissection below uses the amended numbering throughout, with the original count noted where the ruling addressed it.

Inside the amended master complaint: the sixteen counts, one by one

Every count below is quoted or cited to the amended master complaint itself (Doc. 481), and each defense position is drawn from the actual motion-to-dismiss briefing and the Court’s ruling — not from press coverage. Each individual plaintiff’s short form complaint adopts whichever of these counts fit their case, by paragraph range. Two counts — failure to warn in negligence and strict liability — carry the litigation’s center of gravity; the rest define its edges. Throughout: these are allegations, which the defendants dispute, and nothing here is a court finding of causation or liability.

Count I — Failure to Warn: Negligence (¶¶ 606–640)

What it pleads. That the manufacturers owed “a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing, researching, testing, manufacturing, marketing, supplying, promoting, advertising, packaging, labeling, selling and/or distributing” their GLP-1 medications (¶ 607) and breached it because they “knew or should have known that the drugs could proximately cause Plaintiffs’ injuries and/or presented an unreasonably high risk of injuries” without adequate warning (¶ 608).

The defense position. The defendants never moved to dismiss this count — their brief targeted Counts III–XIV of the original complaint only. Their defense of the warn claims runs through the merits instead: that the FDA-approved labels disclosed the relevant gastrointestinal risks, and — the fight being heard at the September 2026 Rule 702 hearings — that plaintiffs cannot prove general causation with admissible expert evidence.

What it does not establish. Pleading a failure to warn is not proof of one; no court has found any warning inadequate, and the learned-intermediary doctrine (warnings run to the prescriber, not the patient) shapes how these claims are measured in most states.

Count II — Failure to Warn: Strict Liability (¶¶ 641–674)

What it pleads. The same warning gap as Count I, but without needing to prove carelessness: that the medications were “defective” as marketed because their labeling did not adequately warn of the risks, making the products unreasonably dangerous when used as directed (¶¶ 642–644 and following).

The defense position. Also not challenged at the pleading stage. The practical defense is the same: label adequacy and expert causation. Strict-liability warn claims are also where state-law differences bite hardest — some states channel them into product liability acts (see Count XIII), and the amended complaint expressly pleads “pursuant to all laws that may apply according to choice of law principles, including the law of each Plaintiff’s resident State” (¶ 641).

What it does not establish. “Strict” liability does not mean automatic liability — a plaintiff still must prove the warning was inadequate and that the inadequacy caused their injury.

Count III — Breach of Express Warranty (¶¶ 675–698)

What it pleads. That the defendants “expressly represented to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ prescribing physicians that their GLP-1 RA Products were safe” for their approved uses (¶ 677), through labels, advertising, and promotional statements that became part of the basis of the bargain — and that the products did not conform.

The defense position. Dismissal was sought on the theory that “generalized statements that a medicine is ‘safe’ or ‘effective’ do not create an express warranty” — they are “opinion or commendation,” not warranties, and FDA-required label language cannot be read as one (Doc. 329-1; Doc. 465 at 24–30).

Where it stands. The Court denied the motion as to this count (Doc. 465 at 32; Doc. 466).

What it does not establish. Whether any specific representation reached a specific plaintiff or physician, and was relied on, remains an individual, case-by-case question.

Count IV — Breach of Implied Warranty (¶¶ 699–720)

What it pleads. That by placing the medications on the market the defendants “impliedly warranted” they were of merchantable quality and fit for their ordinary purpose (¶ 702), and that the alleged injury risks made them neither.

The defense position. That “many courts reject such claims in product liability cases,” and that plaintiffs had not pleaded the elements state by state (Doc. 465 at 24, summarizing Doc. 329-1).

Where it stands. Motion denied (Doc. 465 at 36; Doc. 466). The Court declined to resolve state-by-state variations at the master-pleading stage.

What it does not establish. Some states restrict implied-warranty claims for prescription drugs or fold them into other causes of action; whether this count survives in a given plaintiff’s case depends on their state’s law.

Count V — Fraudulent Concealment / Fraud by Omission (¶¶ 721–779)

What it pleads. The complaint’s longest count — 59 paragraphs — alleging the defendants “knew or should have known that their GLP-1 RA Products were unreasonably dangerous because of the increased risk of gastroparesis; gastroparesis requiring hospitalization or emergency care; refractory gastroparesis potentially leading to debilitating secondary conditions such as Wernicke’s encephalopathy; . . . bowel/intestinal obstruction/blockage; ileus; gallbladder conditions necessitating surgery; . . . acute necrotizing pancreatitis; ischemic bowel” and more (¶ 723), and concealed that information from patients and prescribers.

The defense position. That these are “quintessentially vague” fraud allegations that fail Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement even under the relaxed standard for omissions (Doc. 465 at 38, summarizing Doc. 329-1).

Where it stands. Split. The claim survived “to the extent Plaintiffs allege fraudulent omission of information about the Alleged Injuries in the medications’ labels”; it was dismissed with leave to amend as to omissions in communications outside the labels and as to concealment of testing inadequacy (Doc. 465 at 42, 79). The amended count was repleaded to meet that ruling.

What it does not establish. Fraud requires proof of knowledge, intent, and reliance — the most demanding proof standards in the case. Nothing has been proven.

Count VI — Fraudulent / Intentional Misrepresentation (¶¶ 780–800)

What it pleads. Affirmative false statements, not just omissions: that “[i]n the labels, advertising, promotion, and marketing, Defendants intentionally and knowingly downplayed or minimized” the medications’ effect on gastric emptying and the severity of gastrointestinal effects (¶ 783).

The defense position. That the count rested on “the quintessentially vague and overly generalized allegations that courts reject as failing to meet Rule 9(b)” (Doc. 465 at 42, quoting the briefing).

Where it stands. The original version was dismissed with leave to amend — the Court declined to let it proceed as a “placeholder” count on a master basis (Doc. 465 at 43). The amended complaint repleads it; individual plaintiffs who assert it typically add case-specific fraud allegations in their short form complaint, as the hosted example on our short-form-complaint page shows.

What it does not establish. Which, if any, specific advertisement or statement any individual plaintiff or physician saw and relied on — that is individual proof.

Count VII — Negligent Misrepresentation / Marketing (¶¶ 801–824)

What it pleads. That the defendants “negligently provided Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ prescribing physicians, the general medical community, and the public with false and/or incorrect information or omitted or failed to disclose material information” about the medications’ safety, risks, and long-term effects (¶ 802).

The defense position. Against the misrepresentation family (original Counts VIII–X), the defendants argued no “actionable misstatements” were identified and that marketing statements were not “quantifiable and measurable” facts (Doc. 465 at 24, 48).

Where it stands. Split, mostly survived. The Court held plaintiffs sufficiently alleged misrepresentation of the medications’ weight-loss benefits in identified consumer communications and of the risks in the labels; claims based on unidentified communications to physicians and the medical community were dismissed with leave (Doc. 465 at 49–52, 79).

What it does not establish. The Court flagged justifiable reliance as an open question even for the surviving theories (Doc. 465 at 52 n.20).

Count VIII — Strict Product Liability Misrepresentation / Marketing (¶¶ 825–848)

What it pleads. The same misrepresentation theory in strict-liability form: material misrepresentations to plaintiffs, prescribers, and the public about safety and risks, on which state law imposes liability without proof of negligence (¶¶ 826–828).

The defense position and where it stands. Briefed and decided together with Counts VII and IX — the same split: weight-loss-benefit misrepresentations to consumers and label-risk misstatements survived; unidentified physician-directed communications did not (Doc. 465 at 79).

What it does not establish. Not every state recognizes a standalone strict-liability misrepresentation tort; its availability is a state-law question resolved case by case.

Count IX — Innocent Misrepresentation / Marketing (¶ 849)

What it pleads. A single paragraph incorporating the misrepresentation allegations (¶¶ 801–848) under the handful of state doctrines that allow recovery for material misrepresentations made without fault — innocently — where the seller benefited.

The defense position and where it stands. Same briefing and same split outcome as Counts VII and VIII (Doc. 465 at 79).

What it does not establish. Innocent misrepresentation is among the narrowest theories pleaded — recognized in few states and rarely dispositive; it exists in the master complaint so that plaintiffs in those states can adopt it.

Count X — Unfair Trade Practices / Consumer Protection (¶¶ 850–865)

What it pleads. Violations of state consumer-protection and unfair-trade-practices statutes, pleaded “under all applicable unfair trade practices and consumer protection acts, statutes, and laws of each Plaintiff’s respective resident State” (¶ 850) — with the amended complaint now listing the specific statutes and subsections, state by state (see the inventory below). Notably, the count does not plead the consumer-protection statutes of Alaska, Tennessee, or Washington.

The defense position. This was original Count VII, and the defendants’ core argument was structural: the count “references, without context, the statutes of 55 states and territories,” leaving everyone “to guess what unfair trade practices claims they are asserting” (Doc. 465 at 73, quoting Doc. 329-1 at 32).

Where it stands. Dismissed with leave — and rebuilt. The Court required plaintiffs to identify specific statutes and subsections. The amended count does so, and the short form complaint now carries the requirement into every individual case: a plaintiff checking Count X must identify their statute and supporting facts, on pain of the short form being “stricken with only one opportunity to amend” (Doc. 465 at 74 n.33, quoted in the short form itself).

What it does not establish. Several states bar or restrict consumer-protection claims arising from prescription-drug injuries; the defendants briefed those limits state by state, and the Court expressly deferred all state-specific issues.

Count XI — Negligence (¶¶ 866–880)

What it pleads. General negligence in the “researching, testing, marketing, promotion, advertising, packaging, labeling, supplying, selling and/or distributing” of the medications (¶ 868) — the broad common-law claim, restructured after the ruling to separate its theories from the warn and design claims.

The defense position. That the original catch-all version (original Count XIII) “merely repackages” the failure-to-warn and design claims, and that to keep the master-complaint process “meaningful” and the pleading “comprehensible,” any general negligence claim should have to spell out how its theories differ from the other negligence-based counts (Doc. 465 at 65–66, summarizing Doc. 329-1).

Where it stands. Dismissed with leave. The Court agreed the count was too entangled to administer — noting the confusion would “only be compounded” once “dozens of lawyers not associated with Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel” had to interpret it when selecting counts for their clients — and required an amended version that “more precisely separates out the various theories” with their factual support (Doc. 465 at 69).

What it does not establish. To the extent a negligence theory sounds in design defect, the preemption ruling that eliminated the design counts still constrains it.

Count XII — Negligent Undertaking (¶¶ 881–903)

What it pleads. A distinctive theory: that by choosing to market prescription drugs directly to consumers, the defendants “voluntarily undertook the responsibility” to do so truthfully and non-misleadingly — and are liable for performing that undertaking negligently (¶¶ 882–883).

The defense position. That negligent undertaking is “inapplicable in the prescription drug context,” that the learned-intermediary doctrine means manufacturers owe warning duties to physicians rather than patients, and that the New Jersey case plaintiffs lean on (Perez v. Wyeth) “is an outlier opinion that many other state courts have declined to follow” (Doc. 465 at 24, 72, quoting Doc. 329-1 at 41–43).

Where it stands. Motion denied — the Court declined to resolve the state-law dispute at the pleading stage (Doc. 465 at 72).

What it does not establish. Whether any given state actually recognizes the theory for direct-to-consumer drug advertising remains squarely contested.

Count XIII — State Product Liability Acts (¶¶ 904–911)

What it pleads. That in the states with product liability acts — statutes that fold some or all traditional product claims into a single statutory cause of action — plaintiffs proceed under the statute. The count lists eleven: Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washington, with citations (¶ 906; full table below). “Not all causes of action are subsumed within every state’s PLA, it varies by jurisdiction” (¶ 905).

The defense position. The defendants pressed for exactly this specificity — arguing plaintiffs “should be required to specifically plead claims being brought under state PLAs,” including subsections, so state-specific motions could be addressed efficiently (Doc. 465 at 75).

Where it stands. This count is new in the amended complaint — the Court agreed PLA claims must be identified, and the short form complaint’s ¶ 21 requires each plaintiff asserting one to name the statute, its subsections, and which theories it subsumes, with the same strike warning (Doc. 465 at 76 n.35). The hosted Indiana example shows what a completed ¶ 21 looks like in practice.

What it does not establish. In PLA states, the statute can displace the common-law counts rather than add to them — a plaintiff’s real claim menu depends on their state.

Count XIV — Wrongful Death (¶¶ 912–918)

What it pleads. That certain plaintiffs “suffered and incurred a premature and untimely death as a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of the Defendants” (¶ 913), with claims brought by spouses, children, and estate representatives under each state’s wrongful-death law (¶ 914).

The defense position and where it stands. Not challenged at the pleading stage (the original counterpart was outside the motion). Wrongful-death claims rise or fall with the underlying liability counts and each state’s beneficiary and deadline rules — which are often shorter and stricter than injury deadlines.

What it does not establish. No court has found any death caused by these medications; death-case causation is among the most heavily contested issues in the litigation.

Count XV — Loss of Consortium (¶¶ 919–922)

What it pleads. That spouses and, where state law allows, children of injured plaintiffs “have suffered the loss of services, care, comfort, society, and affection” as a result of the injuries (¶ 922).

Where it stands. Not challenged. It is derivative: it exists only where an underlying injury claim succeeds, and only in the form the plaintiff’s state recognizes.

Count XVI — Survival Action (¶¶ 923–926)

What it pleads. That a deceased plaintiff’s estate may pursue the claims the person would have had — conscious pain and suffering, medical expenses, losses before death — “under applicable state law” (¶ 924).

Where it stands. Not challenged. Like wrongful death, it is governed by state-specific statutes, including who may sue and by when. The short form complaint asks for the representative capacity up front (its ¶¶ 2–3).

The state-law inventory: what the complaint pleads, state by state

Two of the sixteen counts are built out of state statutes, and after the August 2025 ruling the amended complaint names them precisely. That precision was forced. In their reply the defendants attacked what they called an “intent-to-plead” approach — arguing that gesturing at the unfair-trade and product-liability statutes of 55 states and territories, without identifying the provisions relied on, gave neither the court nor the defense notice of what was actually being claimed (Doc. 392 §§ III.B.3, VII). The Court agreed far enough to dismiss the statutory claims with leave to amend, and the inventory below is the answer plaintiffs filed. It is why a state’s statute appears here as a citation rather than an intention. The table below is the complete inventory as pleaded: the consumer-protection statutes invoked in Count X (¶¶ 850–865) and the product liability acts listed in Count XIII (¶ 906). This is the reference layer for the rest of our state coverage — each state page links back to these rows. Three things to read it with: the statutes are what plaintiffs’ leadership pleaded, not what any court has endorsed; an individual plaintiff asserts a statute only by identifying it in their own short form complaint (with the specificity the Court required); and in the eleven PLA states, the act may replace some common-law counts rather than add to them.

Count X also pleads the consumer-protection laws of American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands (not shown), and does not plead those of Alaska, Tennessee, or Washington. Statutory citations are reproduced as pleaded in Doc. 481; pleading a statute is not a representation that it ultimately applies to any particular case.

What the master complaint does not establish

A complaint — even a 264-page one that survived a motion to dismiss — is one side’s allegations, tested so far only for whether they are adequately pleaded, never for whether they are true. Reading this document establishes none of the following: that any GLP-1 medication caused any person’s injury (general and specific causation are exactly what the September 2026 Rule 702 hearings will test, at the level of expert admissibility); that any warning was legally inadequate; that any marketing statement was false or misleading; or that anyone is entitled to compensation. No GLP-1 case has reached a verdict and none has settled. Some of what the original complaint attempted is already out: the design-defect counts were dismissed as preempted, the standalone medical-monitoring remedy was dismissed as pleaded, and the breadth of what remains varies by state and by plaintiff. The distance between what is pleaded here and what our firm currently accepts — confirmed stomach injuries and NAION vision loss — reflects that gap between allegation and proof.

How an individual case is actually filed

Since October 2025, joining MDL 3094 means filing the 11-page Short Form Complaint on a new member-case docket in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania — identifying the plaintiff, the medications, the injuries, and checking which of the sixteen counts above the case adopts, with statutory claims (Counts X and XIII) spelled out subsection by subsection. The blank form is hosted at the top of this page. We maintain a separate, field-by-field walkthrough of the form — including a real, completed example from the docket and the two specificity traps the Court built into it — on the short form complaint page.

Common questions

No Ozempic or other GLP-1 lawsuit has been settled, and no court or jury has found that these medications caused anyone’s injury — the litigation is ongoing, with major expert-evidence rulings still ahead. Whether any individual has a claim depends on their own medical records and the law of their state.

Do not stop, start, or change any prescribed medication because of anything on this page. Those decisions belong with your prescriber.

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This page is attorney advertising and is for informational purposes only; it is not legal or medical advice. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Contacting the firm does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The filings: the gastric-emptying-study order (Doc. 468), CMO 12 (NAION MDL), the lawsuit tracker, and the September 2026 expert hearing.

The companies & court files: Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk.