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Olympus Scope — Infection Claims
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Direct Answer After the February 2015 FDA Safety Communication, Olympus was ordered under Section 522 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to conduct postmarket surveillance of its duodenoscopes. More than two years later, in March 2018, the FDA issued a warning letter confirming that Olympus had established zero surveillance sites — while simultaneously under criminal investigation for failing to report adverse events.
Regulatory Body
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Action Date
March 2018 (Warning Letter)
Action Type
FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986
Key Finding
Zero surveillance sites established / Section 522 order defied / criminal investigation concurrent
What Is an FDA Postmarket Surveillance Order and Why Did Olympus Receive One?
Section 522 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 360l) authorizes the FDA to order manufacturers of Class II or Class III devices to conduct postmarket surveillance when there is reason to believe the device may present a serious risk to health. Following the February 2015 Safety Communication acknowledging that Olympus duodenoscope cleaning instructions “may be inadequate,” the FDA ordered Olympus to conduct mandatory postmarket surveillance of its duodenoscopes. The surveillance order required Olympus to establish surveillance sites — hospitals actively using duodenoscopes — where real-world contamination rates, infection transmission rates, and patient outcome data would be systematically collected and reported to the FDA.
This was not a suggestion or a recommendation. Section 522 orders are mandatory. Failure to comply constitutes a regulatory violation. The FDA issued the order because it had reason to believe Olympus duodenoscopes presented a serious risk to health — a conclusion supported by the 75 Medical Device Reports (MDRs) covering approximately 135 patients that had already been received at the time of the February 2015 Safety Communication.
The Senate HELP Committee report Preventable Tragedies (January 13, 2016) documented that Olympus had been receiving reports of contamination-linked outbreaks since fall 2012, and had failed to report that information to the FDA through the period covered by the Section 522 order. The surveillance order was the regulatory response to a three-year pattern of non-reporting — and Olympus defied it.
What Did Olympus Do After Receiving the Surveillance Order?
Nothing. More than two years after the Section 522 surveillance order was issued, the FDA sent Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986 in March 2018 documenting that Olympus had established zero surveillance sites. Not one hospital. Not one data collection protocol. Not one data point submitted to the FDA. (Source: FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986, March 2018.) The timing of the surveillance defiance makes the conduct more serious, not less.
While Olympus was ignoring the mandatory surveillance order, the company was simultaneously under active criminal investigation for failing to report adverse-event information to the FDA — the same FDA that had ordered the surveillance. The Department of Justice criminal investigation that resulted in the December 2018 guilty plea was proceeding during the same period that Olympus was defying the surveillance order.
The criminal reporting-failure period (adverse events omitted from FDA MDRs, 2012–2018) overlaps precisely with the surveillance non-compliance period (order issued 2015, zero sites confirmed March 2018). Olympus pleaded guilty on December 10, 2018, paying $85 million and admitting to 3 counts of distributing misbranded medical devices by failing to report adverse-event information to the FDA during the period when US hospital outbreaks were occurring (Case No. 2:18-cr-00727-SRC, D.N.J.).
Nine months earlier, the FDA had documented that Olympus had also ignored the mandatory order to collect safety data that would have added to that same adverse event record. Two simultaneous regulatory violations — criminal reporting failure and surveillance defiance — during the same period. (Source: DOJ press release, December 10, 2018.)
What Would Postmarket Surveillance Have Shown?
If Olympus had established surveillance sites and collected data as ordered, the FDA would have received systematic contamination rate data beginning in 2015 or 2016. We know what that data would have shown because independent researchers collected it without Olympus’s cooperation. A 2022 meta-analysis of 9,084 post-reprocessing cultures found 5 percent contamination even after enhanced cleaning protocols, with 0.8 percent high-risk organisms.
(Citation: Bomman et al., Clinical Endoscopy, January 2022, PMC8831410.) An 8-year retrospective study found 94.7 percent AM20 contamination by 2022 and confirmed that all manufacturer-recommended interventions — disposable endcaps, new automated reprocessors, staff audits — failed to produce a meaningful reduction in contamination rates. (Citation: van der Ploeg et al., Gut, 2024;73(4):613–621, PMID 38182137.) The October 2025 Urgent Field Safety Notice issued by Olympus subsequently confirmed why all interventions failed: the underlying inspection protocol itself was inadequate and required 10X magnification tools that hospitals had never been told to use.
Real-world surveillance data — the data Olympus refused to collect — would have confirmed these contamination rates years before the academic literature did. Had Olympus complied with the surveillance order and submitted accurate data to the FDA, the regulatory response would have been earlier, more comprehensive, and potentially life-saving. Olympus’s refusal to collect this data was not a passive failure. It was an active choice to prevent adverse event information from reaching the agency during the same period the company was already criminally failing to report that same category of information.
What Is the Legal Significance of Olympus’s Surveillance Non-Compliance?
Surveillance non-compliance has three direct legal consequences for product liability plaintiffs. First: it extends the knowing non-reporting period. The criminal plea established criminal reporting failure through December 2018. The surveillance defiance extended the regulatory obstruction through at least March 2018 — the two periods overlap and reinforce each other. Olympus was not merely slow to act on its safety obligations.
It was actively defying a mandatory safety order while simultaneously being criminally investigated for failing to report the very data the order was designed to generate. Second: it supports a failure-to-warn claim. Olympus’s refusal to collect surveillance data prevented both the FDA and individual hospitals from understanding the true scope of the contamination problem. Had the surveillance data been collected and submitted as required, hospital infection control professionals and FDA regulators would have had systematic, manufacturer-generated data on contamination rates and patient outcomes — data that would have enabled earlier interventions.
Olympus’s failure to generate and submit that data is evidence of a systemic failure to warn. The Virginia Mason outbreak (32 patients, 7 died within 31 days, MDR E. coli recovered from 4 of 8 scopes) and the CRE outbreaks at the Illinois teaching hospital (39 patients, NDM-producing E. coli) and UCLA (17 patients, 2 deaths) were all occurring during the surveillance non-compliance period. (Sources: PMID 26092616; PMID 25291580; PMID 29579235.) Third: it is direct regulatory evidence of the company’s disregard for patient safety throughout the claims period.
A defendant that defies a mandatory safety order — while under criminal investigation for the same conduct the order is designed to prevent — cannot credibly argue it acted in good faith toward patient safety. The surveillance non-compliance, the criminal reporting failure, the 2023 warning letter for failing to investigate the MAJ-2315 distal end cover cracking defect, and the FDA Import Alert 89-04 issued in June 2025 blocking 58 Olympus device models from the United States form a continuous pattern of regulatory resistance spanning more than a decade.
Timeline: Surveillance Order, Defiance, and Concurrent Criminal Investigation
Fall 2012
UPMC Presbyterian Hospital notifies Olympus of the first confirmed US CRE outbreak linked to Olympus duodenoscopes. Olympus does not issue a safety alert. Failure to report adverse-event information to the FDA begins.
February 19, 2015
FDA Safety Communication: cleaning instructions “may be inadequate” — uncertain regulatory language issued three years after Olympus first learned of the problem. 75 MDRs covering approximately 135 patients had been received. FDA issues Section 522 postmarket surveillance order requiring Olympus to establish surveillance sites.
January 13, 2016
Senate HELP Committee report Preventable Tragedies documents Olympus’s failure to report outbreak data dating to fall 2012 — the same period the Section 522 order was issued. Olympus still has not established any surveillance sites.
March 2018
FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986 confirms: zero surveillance sites established more than two years after the mandatory order. This occurs during the active DOJ criminal investigation for the same category of conduct — failing to report adverse-event information to the FDA.
December 10, 2018
Olympus Corporation of the Americas pleads guilty in the District of New Jersey — $85 million, 3 counts of distributing misbranded devices, admits failing to report adverse events from 2012 through 2018. Criminal reporting-failure period overlaps precisely with surveillance non-compliance period. (DOJ press release; Case No. 2:18-cr-00727-SRC, D.N.J.)
March 2023
FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 654013: Olympus failed to investigate cracking of the MAJ-2315 distal end cover component for approximately two years after becoming aware of the defect. The pattern of regulatory non-response continues five years after the criminal plea.
December 2024
FDA Class I Recall Z-0905-2025: MAJ-891 Forceps/Irrigation Plug — 30,140 units, 120+ injuries, 1 confirmed death. Class I = reasonable probability of serious adverse health consequences or death.
June 24, 2025
FDA Import Alert 89-04: 58 Olympus device models blocked from entering the US from the Aizu, Japan manufacturing facility. Basis: 21 CFR Part 820 Quality System Regulation noncompliance. The import block is the most sweeping enforcement action in the company’s US history.
October 14–17, 2025
Olympus Urgent Field Safety Notice (worldwide): prior reprocessing protocols admitted inadequate, naked-eye inspection insufficient, 10X magnification required, 2 deaths and 5 injuries confirmed. Olympus’s own admission that the inspection protocol it provided to hospitals for the entire pre-2025 period was insufficient.
What Does Olympus’s Surveillance Failure Mean for Patients Who Developed Infections After ERCP?
If Olympus had complied with the mandatory Section 522 surveillance order, the FDA and hospitals would have had systematic contamination rate data beginning in 2015 or 2016 — years before academic research independently confirmed those rates. Three consequences for plaintiffs:
- The surveillance failure extends the period during which Olympus was actively withholding safety information from the FDA and from the hospitals that were performing ERCP procedures on patients. The criminal reporting failure and the surveillance defiance are not separate violations — they are two instruments of the same ongoing conduct.
- Had surveillance data been submitted as required, hospitals would have received systematic, manufacturer-generated data on contamination rates from their specific device type — not the general warnings in the 2015 Safety Communication, but real-world data from their own procedure environment. Earlier, more specific data would have enabled earlier interventions. Olympus’s deliberate prevention of that data flow is evidence of failure to warn.
- Patients who had an ERCP using an Olympus duodenoscope on or after January 1, 2015, developed a confirmed infection requiring inpatient hospitalization and IV antibiotic treatment within 30 days, may have a claim. The surveillance failure is one more element of evidence supporting that Olympus knew of the contamination risk and chose not to disclose or quantify it. Contact Marin & Murphy for a free evaluation.
Contact Marin & Murphy today for a free case evaluation: (888) 348-2735 Marin & Murphy Law Firm is investigating Olympus scope infection claims for patients in Rhode Island, South Carolina, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and nationwide. The consultation is free and creates no obligation.
Frequently Asked Questions About Olympus’s Postmarket Surveillance Failure
What did the FDA order Olympus to do after the 2015 safety communication?
Following the February 2015 Safety Communication, the FDA issued a Section 522 postmarket surveillance order under 21 U.S.C. § 360l, requiring Olympus to establish surveillance sites at hospitals actively using duodenoscopes and collect real-world contamination rate, infection transmission, and patient outcome data to be systematically reported to the FDA.
Section 522 orders are mandatory under federal law — they are not voluntary commitments or suggested best practices. Failure to comply with a Section 522 order is a regulatory violation that can result in a warning letter, injunction, or other enforcement action. The FDA issued the surveillance order because it had reason to believe Olympus duodenoscopes presented a serious risk to health — the statutory standard required to invoke Section 522 authority.
The surveillance order was the FDA’s mechanism for generating the real-world contamination data it needed to assess the true scope of the problem. Olympus was the manufacturer best positioned to generate that data — and was legally required to do so. Its refusal to comply meant that the data the FDA needed to make fully informed regulatory decisions was never generated or submitted. (Source: 21 U.S.C. § 360l; FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986, March 2018.)
Did Olympus comply with the FDA postmarket surveillance order?
No. The March 2018 FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986 confirmed that Olympus had established zero surveillance sites — not one hospital, not one data collection protocol — more than two years after the mandatory order was issued.
The warning letter was issued during the same period that Olympus was under active DOJ criminal investigation for failing to report adverse-event information to the FDA from 2012 through 2018 — the investigation that resulted in the December 2018 $85 million guilty plea. The surveillance defiance and the criminal reporting failure were simultaneous and overlapping regulatory violations. Both involved Olympus preventing adverse event information about its duodenoscopes from reaching the FDA.
In March 2023, the FDA issued a second warning letter (MARCS-CMS 654013) documenting that Olympus had failed to investigate the MAJ-2315 distal end cover cracking defect for approximately two years after learning of it — establishing that the 2018 criminal plea and the 2018 surveillance warning letter did not change Olympus’s pattern of failing to respond to known safety issues. (Source: FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986, March 2018; FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 654013, March 2023.)
What is a Section 522 postmarket surveillance order?
Section 522 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 360l) authorizes the FDA to order manufacturers of Class II or Class III devices to conduct postmarket surveillance when there is reason to believe the device may present a serious risk to health. The order is mandatory — manufacturers cannot defer or ignore it without regulatory consequence.
The Section 522 authority exists because pre-market clinical data is collected in controlled conditions that may not reflect real-world contamination rates, failure modes, or patient outcomes — particularly for complex reusable devices like duodenoscopes. Post-market surveillance fills this gap by requiring manufacturers to collect and submit systematic data from devices in active clinical use. For a reusable device with a known contamination risk in real-world reprocessing conditions, Section 522 surveillance was precisely the tool designed to assess whether the risk the FDA had identified in the 2015 Safety Communication was being controlled or worsening.
Olympus’s defiance of the Section 522 order prevented that assessment from occurring. (Source: 21 U.S.C. § 360l.)
What data would postmarket surveillance have collected?
If Olympus had established surveillance sites as ordered, the FDA would have received systematic contamination rate data, infection transmission rate data, and patient outcome data from hospitals actively using Olympus duodenoscopes beginning in 2015 or 2016 — years before the academic literature independently established those rates.
A 2022 meta-analysis of 9,084 post-reprocessing cultures found 5 percent contamination even after enhanced cleaning protocols, with 0.8 percent high-risk organisms. (Bomman et al., Clinical Endoscopy, January 2022, PMC8831410.) An 8-year retrospective study found 94.7 percent AM20 contamination and confirmed that all manufacturer-recommended interventions failed to produce a meaningful reduction in contamination rates.
(van der Ploeg et al., Gut, 2024, PMID 38182137.) The October 2025 UFSN confirmed why: the inspection protocol was inadequate and required 10X magnification tools that had never been required. Real-world surveillance data would have reached the FDA years before these findings did. Olympus’s refusal to collect this data was an active choice to prevent adverse event information from reaching the agency — a choice that mirrors the criminal reporting failure the company admitted in December 2018.
(Sources: PMC8831410; PMID 38182137; Olympus UFSN, October 2025.)
How does the surveillance failure affect my lawsuit?
Three consequences: the surveillance failure (1) extends the knowing non-reporting period, (2) supports a failure-to-warn claim, and (3) is direct regulatory evidence of disregard for patient safety throughout the entire claims period.
The extension of the reporting-failure period matters because it establishes that Olympus’s conduct was not limited to the specific adverse event reporting violations in the criminal plea. The company was simultaneously defying a mandatory safety order and failing to report adverse events — two simultaneous mechanisms of preventing safety information from reaching the FDA and the hospitals performing procedures on patients.
The failure-to-warn significance is direct: if the surveillance data had been collected and submitted as required, hospitals would have had systematic, manufacturer-generated contamination rate data from their own device type — data that would have enabled earlier, more targeted interventions. Olympus’s deliberate prevention of that data flow is evidence that it failed to provide hospitals with the safety information they needed to protect patients.
Contact Marin & Murphy at (888) 348-2735 for a free evaluation.
Was the surveillance failure happening at the same time as the criminal investigation?
Yes. The overlap is precise and significant: Olympus’s surveillance non-compliance period (order issued 2015, zero sites confirmed March 2018) overlaps exactly with the criminal reporting-failure period (adverse events omitted from FDA MDRs, 2012–2018) that resulted in the December 2018 guilty plea.
During the same months the Department of Justice criminal investigation was proceeding, Olympus was simultaneously ignoring a mandatory FDA order to collect safety data about the very devices at the center of the criminal case. The two violations were not coincidental — they were concurrent instruments of the same avoidance of regulatory accountability: one criminal (failing to report adverse events in MDRs), and one regulatory (defying the mandatory order to collect new safety data that would have generated additional adverse event information).
The December 2018 criminal plea resolved the criminal liability for the adverse-event reporting-failure period. The surveillance non-compliance was addressed through the March 2018 warning letter. Neither resolution changed Olympus’s subsequent regulatory conduct — the March 2023 warning letter and the June 2025 import alert are evidence that the pattern continued well after both the criminal plea and the surveillance warning letter.
(Source: DOJ press release; FDA WL MARCS-CMS 546986; FDA WL MARCS-CMS 654013.)
Marin & Murphy Law Firm is investigating Olympus scope infection claims for patients in Rhode Island, South Carolina, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and nationwide. Contact us at (888) 348-2735. The consultation is free and creates no obligation.
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Sources (14)
- FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 546986, March 2018. fda.gov
- 21 U.S.C. § 360l — Section 522 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (postmarket surveillance authority). uscode.house.gov
- FDA Safety Communication, February 19, 2015. wayback.archive-it.org
- DOJ press release, December 10, 2018. justice.gov. Case No. 2:18-cr-00727-SRC, D.N.J.
- Senate HELP Committee. Preventable Tragedies. January 13, 2016. help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20Report.pdf
- van der Ploeg K et al. Gut. 2024;73(4):613–621. PMID 38182137. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38182137/
- Bomman S et al. Clinical Endoscopy. January 2022. PMC8831410. ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8831410/
- Larsen S, Russell RV, Ockert LK, Spanos S, Travis HS, Ehlers LH, Mærkedahl A. Rate and impact of duodenoscope contamination: A systematic review and meta-analysis. EClinicalMedicine. 2020 Jul 15;25:100451. doi:10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100451. PMID: 32954234. PMCID: PMC7486302.
- FDA Warning Letter MARCS-CMS 654013, March 2023. fda.gov
- FDA Class I Recall Z-0905-2025, December 18, 2024. accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRes/res.cfm?ID=211489
- FDA Import Alert 89-04, June 24, 2025. accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_241.html
- Olympus Urgent Field Safety Notice, October 14–17, 2025. Retrieved via Estonian RAVIMIAMEET archive; confirmed by HPRA Ireland. (On file.)
- Epstein L et al. JAMA. 2014;312(14):1447–1455. PMID 25291580. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25291580/
- Ross AS et al. Gastrointest Endosc. 2015;82(3):477–83. PMID 26092616. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26092616/
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